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Abstract. Stream database systems are designed to support Ihe fast on-line pro- 
cessing that characterizes many new emergin: applications such as sensor-based 
environments, on-line business processing and network monitoring. Data stream 
processing is a highly demanding environment where streams are usually infi- 
nite. bursty. and running at high arrival rates. Due lo limited buffer storage or 
real-time constraints, data items may be dropped out of the system and lost for 
ever. In many applications. sensitive stream data needs to be secured against ma- 
licious attacks. Various security mechanisms have been well studied in literature. 
However, these mechanisms are no1 tuned 10 work in the lossy streaming envi- 
ronment. Stream security mechanisms are required to pro\'ide security services 
and to be fault-tolerant as well. 
In this paper we identify the security require~ncnts for data stream systems. fo- 
cusinp on Nile. a prototype query processing engine for data streams developed 
at Pur-due Ui~i~:ersir\.. We first propose a security archi~ectl~re for data stream sys- 
tems. then focus on a particular service: data integrity and confidentiality. We 
present a new mechanism. FT-RC4, that provides data integrity and confidential- 
ity. We demonstrate its practicality by implementing i t  inside our prototype data 
stream system and evaluatin_g its performance. 
1 Introduction 
The Internet revolution, and more recently the wide-spread use of wireless and sen- 
sor networks, created a paradigm shift in the way information is accessed and pro- 
cessed- generating new applications such as real-time network monitoring: surveillance, 
tracking, plant maintenance, telecommunications, data management and environmental 
monitoring. Such applications are fundamentally different in the way they produce data 
and perform queries [ I ] .  They continuously generate large volumes of data streams 
obtained from the environment they operate in. Data streams can be obtained from 
n~ult iple  sources at high-arrival (possibly unpredictable) rates. They are continuous and 
unbounded. The transitive characteristic of the data makes storing and processing the 
whole data infeasible. Data items may be dropped from the buffers and lost for ever if 
they are not processed in a timely fashion. Queries that are applied on such data streams 
are not only snapshot queries: but also continuous queries in which the same query is 
incrementally evaluated each time new input arrives. Processing is performed on a slid- 
ing window over the stream to limit the attention to the most recent data items and 
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As data stream applications process sensitive data that is often classified (military 
applications) or private (financial. health applications. etc.) there is an obvious need for 
providing security services not only fol- the applications but for the data stream systems 
themselves. A comprehensive survey of security and privacy requirements and open 
issues for a particular type of stream databases that is generated by a large number of 
sensors is presented in [6]. Below we present the main security services that any data 
stream system that is concerned with security should consider: 
- Authe17tication: authenticates a client when i t  requests access to the system. 
- Access colitrol arid autho~-ieatiori: checks if a given client is authorized to register 
data streams or perform queries on streams. 
- Data co~ijderitialitj.: guarantees that only intended parties can understand the con- 
tent of the stream, the quei-y. 01- the I-esult. 
- Data integrity: ensures that data is in the form that is intended by the originator and 
is not corrupted intentionally 01- unintentionally. 
- Data lion-I-ep~rdintio~l: ensures that a party that performed an operation can not 
deny that he did it. This service is useful for audit purposes. 
- Data privacj.: defines what is the minimum information that should be disclosed 
and provides ways of protecting personal information even after it was disclosed to 
other parties. 
- Data validit!,: ensures that data generated contains meaningful and correct (non- 
misleading) information in the generated data streams. 
- Survivabilig~: provides system recovery from either an attack or a failure and en- 
sures that a service is available. 
- Securih policy: all the above security mechanisms must be governed by a security 
policy. 
Most of the security requirements listed above are not necessarily specific to data 
stream systems. However: most of them are more difficult to provide for data streams 
where standard solutions cannot be applied directly because of the high-demand charac- 
teristics of the environment. Additional research is needed to overcome the challenges 
posed of the new paradigm. One challenge is reconciling application-specific require- 
ments with security services in a high-demand environment. For example, many appli- 
cations such as medical applications 171. require privacy of data, but also audit capabil- 
ity. Solutions proposed to address this problem, provide the desired audit capabilities 
and preserve privacy, but have a high associated cost that makes them prohibitive to 
real-time data stream systems. 
Another challenge originates from the conflict between security and real-time pro- 
cessing. For example. providing fine-granularity access control and authorization can 
have a negative effect on the real-time processing because of the additional processing 
overhead. Another example is providing data confidentiality for data streams. Although 
stream ciphers 181 seem to provide the desired performance for data streams. they fail 
to operate correctly when there is a de-synchronization between the keystream and the 
encrypted data. Such a de-synchronization is very likely to occur in an environment 
where data can be dropped or lost either at the corn~~~ur~icatiori level because of the high 
transmission rate. or at the application level because of the limited storage capability 
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FT-RC4: A Robust Sec~~rity Mechanism for Data Stream Systems 3 
and processing power. The real-time processing does not allow for trying to recover the 
data via retransmissions. 
Several systems were designed to cope with the demanding performance of data 
streams. They include: STREAM [2], Aurora [3]: and Nile 141. However, none of them 
focused on providing security services. 
The work presented in this paper is a first step in addressing security concerns for 
data stream systems. focusing on data integrity and confidentiality. The research in this 
paper is conducted in the context of the Nile [4] prototype data stream system. Our main 
contributions are: 
- We identify security services for data stream systems and propose a secure archi- 
tecture for a prototype data stream system. 
- We focus on data integrity and confidentiality and propose a mechanism appropriate 
to data streams. Our scheme, FT-RC4? is able to withstand data loss and recover 
from it by re-synchronizing the encrypted data with the corresponding keystream. 
- We demonstrate the applicability of FT-RC4 to data streams by implementing it in 
the discussed prototype data stream system and by evaluating it over realistic data 
streams. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We overview related work in 
Section 2 .  We describe how security services can be accommodated in the architecture 
of an existing data stream system in Section 3. Section 4 focuses on data integrity and 
confidentiality and presents the design of our scheme, FT-RC4. Section 5 evaluates the 
performance of the proposed mechanism. Finally, we conclude this work in Section 6. 
2 Related Work 
In this section. we overview the related work in several directions related to the se- 
curity of data streams in particular and databases in general, These directions can be 
summarized as follows: 
Security for Stream Databases. To the best of our knowledge, there is very little 
work that focuses on the security requirements and services for data streams systems. 
A significant work in this direction is the work in [6] that overviews the main research 
directions and challenges in security for sensor network databases. The paper points 
out, among other issues, the need for robust security mechanisms, i.e. mechanisms that 
not only provide security services: but are also fault-tolerant. 
Access Control for Database Systems. Significant work has been conducted in the 
area of providing access control to traditional database systems [9]. Some of the work 
focused on investigating how several access control models can be applied to databases 
(for example RBAC [I 01). Another topic in this area focuses on providing access con- 
trol [I / ] >  protection and administration to XML data sources [I?]. More recent results 
analyze what are the requirements and mechanisms that need to be provided in query 
processing in order to provide very fine-grained access control (at the level of individual 
tuples) [ 131. 
Data Confidentiality and Integrity. Block ciphers,e.g.? DES [I41 and AES [15], 
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dlput interface Stream Proc~s,sing Engine 
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SGUI 'C~S Query Manager 
Stream Stream Storage 
Fig. 1. Nile system architecture 
performance makes them prohibitive to data streams. Another type of ciphers. stream 
ciphers: (such as RC4 [16]) have performance that makes them appropriate for streams. 
Several techniques have been proposed to provide data integrity. They were based on 
hashing techniques to calculate authentication bits that can be viewed as a digest of the 
messages. MD5 [17], SHA1 [IS] and HMAC [19] are examples of these techniques. 
Our work builds on existing work in providing data integrity and confidentiality. 
3 A Security Architecture for Data Stream Systems 
In this section, we discuss how some of the security services presented in Section 1. can 
be achieved in data stream systems. We extend the architecture of a data stream systems 
to accommodate components that are specially designed to provide security services. 
Figure 1 shows the main architectural components of our prototype data stream sys- 
tem. The Strea~n Registration component is the inte~face between the stream generators 
and the system. Its main function is to register new streams into the system. Queries 
need to be registered by the Query Registratio~z component in order to get access to 
the streams inside the system. The Stream Manager component handles multiple in- 
coming streams and acts as a buffer between the streams sources and the Query E11gi11e 
where query processing takes place. The Storage Manager component is responsible for 
building and maintaining summaries over data streams, allowing the system to answer 
queries efficiently. The above described system is extended with two basic components. 
The first component handles authentication, encryption, integrity and non-repudiation 
services. It is responsible for authenticating clients! performing key managemenl, in- 
tegrity and encryption and decryption operations. These services are end-to-end ser- 
vices, thus the component is placed at the outer level of the system. The second compo- 
nent handles access control policies. It is responsible for making sure that queries are 
performed by authorized clients who have access to the targeted streams. This compo- 
nent is placed into the system after the query and stream registration phase to keep track 
of which queries are allowed to access which streams. 
. .
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Fig.2. The effect of lost data ilems on RC4 (a) original image (b) received imase 
4 FT-RC4 Design 
A basic security service that is necessary for data streams is data confidentiality and 
integrity. In this section we focus on this service. 
Stream ciphers, such as RC4 [I61 provide the performance required by the high- 
demand environment of data streams. The main mechanism of such ciphers is to gener- 
ate a keystream based on a shared secret key. The generated keystream is then XOR-ed 
with the original stream to obtain the encrypted stream. The decryption operation is per- 
formed in a similar manner as the encryption: the keystream is recreated at the receiver 
side, then XOR-ed with the encrypted stream to obtain the original data. Stream ciphers, 
including RC4 are vulnerable to de-synchronization between the keystream and the ci- 
phertext, in case of data loss. Figure 2 shows that RC4 [I61 fails to decrypt the data 
after it encounters the first error due to the de-synchronization between the keystream 
and the incoming data stream. 
To overcome this problem: we propose FT-RC4, that builds on the design of RC4. 
FT-RC4 extends RC4 to work in the lossy streaming environment: where recovering the 
data through retransmissions is not an option. Figure 3 presents the design of FT-RC4. 
lT-RC4 consists of three steps taken at the sender side and other corresponding three 
steps at the receiver side. The sender divides the stream into cycles of fixed length. After 
encrypting each cycle, the sender appends synchronization and integrity bits immedi- 
ately after each cycle. The receiver uses these extra bits to check the integrity of data. If 
the cycle is believed to be con-upted, it is thrown away or replaced by zeros. Otherwise, 
the synchronization bits are used to adjust the keystream and decrypt the cycle. For each 
cycle, the following steps are performed at the sender side: 
1 .  The input stream is XOR-ed with the keystream to obtain an encrypted stream. 
2. The encrypted stream is passed through a position registrar to punctuate the stream 
with the current position of the stream by appending strearn positiotl locatirzg bits. 
(Notice that position bits may or may not be encrypted depending on whether we 
are interested in hiding stream contents or contents plus position as well. This en- 
cryption is done through a separate encryption step and may use a different key and 
technique.) 
:
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Encrypted stream data Locator bits 
Fig. 3. Basic components of FT-RC4 
3. The encrypted stream and position punctuation is passed through an integrity en- 
forcer to hash the current cycle and obtain iritegritj bits that are considered as the 
cycle digest that verifies the stream integrity. 
As mentioned above, the receiver does not have the ability to recover the lost data. 
Thus, the receiver goals are to detect a loss and then resynchronize the keystream with 
the incoming encrypted stream. Corrupted cycles are considered lost, while correct cy- 
cles are decrypted and if data loss occurred, used to resynchronize the keystream for 
further decryption. Integriy bits are used to check the integrity for each cycle, while 
stream locatbzg bits are used to fast forward the keystream till it is repositioned at the 
correct position. Due to the bursty nature of streams, errors are usually close-by, de- 
stroying one cycle and leaving others uncorrupted. At the receiver side, the following 
steps are c a ~ ~ i e d  over: 
1 .  The receiver slides a window of the same size as the cycle length over the received 
encrypted stream. It calculates the same hash function and checks the integrity bits. 
If integrity checks, the cycle is considered correct, otherwise, it is considered to be 
corrupted and thrown away. (Notice that the hash function should be evaluated in- 
crementally as the window slides [20] to allow the efficient computation of integrity 
bits as one data item gets into the window and another one leaves it.) 
2. For a correct cycle, the position locating bits are used to fast forward the stream to 
the correct position and to inform the decryptor to report data loss to the client, and 
perhaps add filling values instead of the c o ~ ~ u p t e d  ones. These filling values would 
be of interest to some applicationst e.g., images where image size is important. 
3. The adjusted keystream is XOR-ed with the encrypted stream to obtain the original 
data stream. 
FT-RC4 is able to detect corrupted portions and is able to readjust the keystream in 
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Fig. 4. The effect of lost data items on FT-RC4: (a) I % loss rate. (b) 5% loss rate 
encrypted with FT-RC4, under two loss rates. Figure 4 shows that FT-RC4 recovers 
from lost data and continues the decryption process (whereas RC4 generated garbage 
after the first error it encountered). Although the image gets distorted as the loss rate 
increases, it is still viewable. 
5 Experiments 
In this section. we evaluate the performance of FT-RC4 inside the Nile data stream 
system. We implement FT-RC4 inside Nile and perfolm experiments using a real data 
set generated from Wal*Mart retail stores. Each store is sending its transactions to 
a centralized data stream system for online processing. Each transaction comes in the 
form of <StorelD, ItemlD, Price, Quantit~; TitneStat~zp>. A sample query "Q", shown 
in Figure 5? is performed on the system side under different rates of uniform information 
loss. The query calculates the total revenue by multiplying the price of each item by the 
associated sold quantity and accumulating the sum. A window operator of 5 minutes 
is placed to limit the attention to the most recent five minutes. The window format is 
window (/?our; tnb~utes, seconds, tnseconds). 
SELECT SUM(R1 .Price() * R l.Quantity()) 
FROM Retail l R 1 
WINDOW 00.05.00.00: 
Fig. 5. Query "Q" syntax 
Figure 6 shows the result of query "Q" under different loss rates. The figure shows 
that FT-RC4 is able to produce answers that are very close to the ones in a non-lossy 
environment. The lower the loss rate is, the more accurate results are obtained. The 
obtained result is always less than the exact one due to replacing the lost bytes with 
zeros which in turn decreases the sum value. Figure 7 shows the normalized mean 
square error (MSE) between the exact and obtained answers. The horizontal segments 
' Data was supplied by Wal*Mart and NCR Corporations 
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FT-RC4 Accuracy 
- - 1% LOSS rate 
5% LOSS rate - 
- 10% LOSS rale 
0 ' "  ~ , % C S ~ ~ b q ? ? ? + + + @ & t . 0  
Time 
Fig. 6. The efrect of loss rate on the query answer 
of the curves indicate that the newly-arriving tuples as well as the expiring tuples are 
both correct tuples. Therefore. they do not change the MSE. The positive-slope seg- 
ments indicate that the newly-an-iving tuples are lost and replaced by zeros. Finally, the 
negative-slope segments indicate that expiring tuples are zero-replaced tuples, and their 
expiration reduces the MSE. As expected, the MSE increases with the increase of the 
loss rate. Increasing the loss rate increases the magnitude and number of positive and 
negative slope segments. 
Figure 8 shows the processing time for the FT-RC4 under different cycle sizes. 
Notice that FT-RC4 requires more processing time than RC4 due to augmenting the 
stream with synchronization bytes. The figure shows that as the cycle size increases the 
processing time decreases because the number of the synchronization bytes decreases. 
Figure 9 shows the effect of the cycle size in the recovery process. As the cycle size 
increases, more data is lost. This is because in FT-RC4: if an error occurs in a cycle. the 
whole cycle is lost. Finer granularities of cycles offer a better chance of recovery, at an 
additional processing overhead. 
6 Conclusions 
In this paper, we outlined the desired security services for data streams and suggested 
an architecture for data stream systems that provides such services. We discussed the 
challenges encountered when designing security services for data streams, emphasizing 
the interaction between fault-tolerance and security. 
We exemplified why standard solutions can not directly be applied in a lossy stream 
environment where data loss recovery through retransmissions is not possible, by focus- 
ing on data integrity and confidentiality. We proposed a new scheme FT-RC4 designed 
specifically to cope with the requirements of data streams and showed its usefulness by 
implementing it and evaluating it in the context of a prototype data stream system. 
This work is just the first step towards a secure data stream system. We plan to 
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Fig. 8. The CPU overhead for both RC4 and FT-RC4 
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Fig. 9. The effect of cycle length on the amount of recovered data 
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various requirements.  I n  addition, there are  several o ther  services w e  just  outlined in 
this paper  and which require further research. 
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